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Abstract
We demonstrate a limitation of discounted
expected utility, a standard approach for rep-
resenting the preference to risk when future
cost is discounted. Specifically, we provide
an example of the preference of a decision
maker that appears to be rational but can-
not be represented with any discounted ex-
pected utility. A straightforward modifica-
tion to discounted expected utility leads to
inconsistent decision making over time. We
will show that an iterated risk measure can
represent the preference that cannot be rep-
resented by any discounted expected utility
and that the decisions based on the iterated
risk measure are consistent over time.
1 Introduction
Decision making under uncertainties strongly depends
on how the risk is taken into account. A popular
approach is to formulate a Markov decision process
(MDP) and select actions so that expected return is
maximized [10, 11]. However, such risk-neutral ac-
tions can lead to huge loss with a small probability,
which is not always preferable. A utility-function can
be used to represent the preference to riskiness by en-
forcing that an undesirable outcome has a low value
of utility [15]. When future reward (or cost) is dis-
counted, the standard objective of the MDP in the
literature is Discounted Expected Utility (DEU) [12],￿N
n=0 λ
n E[u(Rn)], where λ is the discount factor, u is
a utility function, Rn is the reward obtained at period
n, and [0, N ] denotes the planning horizon.
The most popular utility-function is of exponential
form [2, 5, 6, 9, 13]. The popularity of the exponential
utility-function is due to its versatility in represent-
ing the preference to riskiness and due to its computa-
tional advantage. By maximizing the expected value of
an exponential utility-function of the return, a decision
maker can select desirable sensitivity to risk by setting
a particular value for the parameter of the exponential
utility-function. Also, dynamic programming can be
used to efficiently find an optimal policy with respect
to the expected exponential-utility [5].
The first contribution of this paper is to demonstrate
a limitation of DEU in representing the preference of
a decision maker who appears to be rational. We show
an example of a setting where a choice appears to be
more attractive than another, but there is no utility
function such that the former choice has a higher value
of DEU than the latter. This limitation stems from
the fact that DEU applies the utility function to the
reward obtained at each period (i.e., u(CR) for each
n) and not to the discounted cumulative reward (i.e.,
u(
￿N
n=1 λ
nRn)). In other words, the DEU takes into
account the risk of the reward obtained at each period,
but not the risk of the discounted cumulative reward.
The study of this particular limitation has not been
reported in the literature.
Unfortunately, selecting actions based on
E[u(
￿N
n=1 λ
nRn)], an Expected Utility of the
Discounted cumulative reward (EUD), can be prob-
lematic. We will see that decisions today can be
inconsistent with decisions in future, when the
decisions are made so that an EUD is maximized
(particularly when the utility function is exponen-
tial). This time-inconsistency has also be observed
implicitly in the prior work, which reports that the
optimal policy of an MDP can change over time when
its objective is to maximize, at each moment, an
EUD with an exponential utility function [6, 16]. We
explicitly construct a simple and clear example that
illuminates time-inconsistency of EUD and discuss its
negative implications.
Our second contribution is to demonstrate that the
limitations of DEU and EUD can be overcome with an
iterated risk measure (IRM) proposed in [1, 4]. Specifi-
cally, we will show that an IRM can represent the pref-
erence of a decision maker that cannot be represented
with any DEU. Also, we can guarantee that the deci-
sions made based on the IRM are time-consistent. In
addition, an optimal policy for an MDP with respect
to an IRM can be found efficiently with dynamic pro-
gramming, if the IRM has the properties that we refer
to as strong monotonicity, translation-invariance, and
positive homogeneity. We will also discuss the cases
where some of the properties are not required to be
satisfied for dynamic programming to apply.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we show the limitations of DEU and EUD. In
Section 3, we will show that these limitations can be
overcome with IRMs, where the definition of IRM is
stated only informally. In Section 4, we will state a for-
mal definition of the IRM and discuss when dynamic
programming can be used to find an optimal policy
with respect to an IRM. In Section 5, we will show
that an IRM has advantage over expected exponential
utility even when future reward is not discounted.
2 Limitations of standard approaches
In the following, we consider disutility of cost, in-
stead of utility of reward, so that a decision-maker
following DEU chooses the policy that minimizes
DEUu¯,λ({Cn}N0 ) ≡
￿N
n=0 λ
n E [u¯(Cn)], where λ is a
discount rate, u¯(·) ≡ −u(·) is a disutility function, and
Cn ≡ −Rn is the cost incurred at time n. We limit
our discussion to a finite N . We choose to minimize
disutility rather than maximizing utility, because we
will also study risk measures, which are minimized by
convention. Throughout, we assume that u¯(c) is in-
creasing with c (i.e., the greater the cost, the greater
the disutility). Without loss of generality, let u¯(0) = 0.
One might suspect that preference of a decision maker
might be better represented with EUDu¯,λ({Cn}N0 ) ≡
E[u(
￿N
n=0 λ
n Cn)] or more generally with a Risk
Measure of the Discounted cumulative cost (RMD):
RMDRM,λ({Cn}N0 ) ≡ RM[
￿N
n=0 λ
n Cn], where RM de-
notes a risk measure, an arbitrary function that maps
a random variable to a real number. Notice that EUD
and RMD can represent the preference of a decision
maker who is sensitive to the risk of cumulative cost
rather than to the risk of the cost incurred at each
period. Notice that DEU is equivalent to EUD if and
only if their disutility function u¯ is identity.
In Section 2.1, we illustrate the limitation of DEU in
representing the preference of a risk-sensitive decision
maker. In Section 2.2, we illustrate that EUD can lead
to inconsistent decisions over time. Throughout this
section, future cost is in general discounted.
Day 0 Day 1 · · · Day 19 Probability
A $1K 0 · · · 0 1.0
B $1K $1K · · · $1K 0.0475
0 0 · · · 0 0.9525
Table 1: Payments with A and B. Each row shows
payments for 20 days and the associated probability.
2.1 Limitation of DEU
We construct an example of the preference that ap-
pears rational but cannot be represented with any
DEU. Consider the two payment methods, A and B,
summarized in Table 1. With A, we pay $1,000 today
(Day 0). With B, we might pay $1,000 on each of the
consecutive 20 days starting from today, but the pay-
ment is needed only with probability 0.0475. The ex-
pected amount of total payment with B is $950, which
is smaller than the $1,000 with A. However, B would
require a huge amount of $20,000 with nonnegligible
probability. Hence, decision makers who are averse to
risk would prefer A to B, which we claim to be rational.
We will show that this rational preference (i.e., A is
preferred to B) cannot be represented with any DEU.
Specifically, we will show that, for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
there is no disutility function u¯ such that
DEUu¯,λ({An}190 ) ≤ DEUu¯,λ({Bn}190 ) (1)
where An denotes the amount of payment with A on
Day n for n = 0, 1, . . . , 19, and we define Bn analo-
gously. Recall that u¯(0) = 0 and u¯ is increasing, so
that u¯1 ≡ u¯($1, 000) > 0. Because DEUu¯,λ({Bn}190 ) is
increasing with λ when u¯1 > 0 and u¯(0) = 0, we have
DEUu¯,λ({Bn}190 ) ≤ DEUu¯,1({Bn}190 ) = 20× 0.0495u1
< u1 = DEUu¯,λ({An}190 ),
which implies that no u¯ and λ satisfy (1). The above
argument can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1 Let A0 = c > 0 and An = 0, ∀n ∈
[1, N ]. Let Pr(Bn = c, ∀n ∈ [0, N ]) = (1− ε)/(N + 1)
and Pr(Bn = 0, ∀n ∈ [0, N ]) = 1 − (1 − ε)/(N + 1)
for 0 < ε < 1. Then, for any 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, we have
DEUu¯,λ({An}N0 ) > DEUu¯,λ({Bn}N0 ) for any increasing
(disutility) function u¯.
It is evident that the limitation of DEU comes from
the fact that it ignores the disutility of discounted cu-
mulative cost, taking into account only the disutility
of immediate cost. We will next study EUD that can
take into account the disutility of
￿N
n=0 λ
n Cn, the
discounted cumulative cost. We will not consider dis-
counted risk measure,
￿N
n=0 λ
n RM[Cn], which might
solve the issues of DEU for particular settings but in
Amount Year Probability
X $1K 1 0.3
Y $2K 2 0.1
Table 2: Amount of payment, year to payment, and
the probability of payment.
general suffers from the drawback that it is only sen-
sitive to the risk of immediate cost.
2.2 Limitations of EUD
It might appear that we could use any disutility func-
tion in EUD (and any risk measure in RMD), but
this turns out to be largely false for rational decision-
making. In this section, we will show that the optimal
policy can change simply because the time has passed
if the decision is made based on an EUD. In particular,
we consider the EUD whose disutility function is of an
exponential form, expu(γ)(C) ≡ exp(γ C) for γ > 0,
which is the popular and standard disutility function
in the literature. The larger the γ is, the more strongly
the decision maker is averse to the risk.
Minimizing E[expu(γ)(C)] for γ > 0 is essentially
equivalent to minimizing an entropic risk measure
[3], ERM(γ)[C] ≡ 1γ lnE[exp(γ C)]. However, ERM
has additional desirable properties. For example,
ERM can represent risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-
seeking preferences in a coherent way. By minimizing
ERM(γ)[C] with γ < 0, the decision maker can seek risk
more aggressively than by minimizing E[C]. Although
minimizing ERM(γ)[C] for γ < 0 is essentially equiv-
alent to maximizing E[expu(γ)(C)], the disutility is
meant to be minimized (hence, E[expu(γ)(C)] is defined
only for γ > 0). Furthermore, ERM(γ)[C] → E[C],
risk-neutral, as γ → 0. In Section 3, we will also see
that ERM can be calculated recursively. In the fol-
lowing, we discuss ERM, but the results also apply to
EUD with exponential disutility.
We now consider the two methods of payment, X and
Y (see Table 2). With X, payment is needed with
probability 0.3, and we pay $1,000 a year from today
if the payment is needed. With Y, payment of $2,000
is needed two years from today with probability 0.1.
Let the discount rate be λ = 0.92 a year. Let X de-
note the random variable representing the amount of
payment with X. We define Y analogously. A key as-
sumption here is that no information about X and Y
is revealed for a year. For example, immediately be-
fore a year from today, X is still random (X = $1K
with probability 0.3 and X = 0 otherwise); X becomes
deterministic exactly a year from today.
Consider a risk-averse decision maker, who chooses ac-
Traffic condition, Ψ Normal Busy
Probability 0.9 0.1
TP 10 U [20, 80]
TQ U [0, 20] 50
Table 3: Travel time along path P and path Q, where
U [a, b] denotes a uniform distribution with support
[a, b] for a < b.
tions based on ERM(γ0) with γ0 = 0.001. Today, he
would choose Y, because ERM(γ0)[0.922 γ0 Y ] ≈ 367
is smaller than ERM(γ0)[0.92 γ0X] ≈ 373. How-
ever, if he evaluates the risk again immediately be-
fore a year from today, then he would prefer X to
Y, because ERM(γ0)[γ0X] ≈ 415 is smaller than
ERM(γ0)[0.92γ0 Y ] ≈ 425. Note that his preference has
changed simply because the time has passed. For this
reason, we say that ERM is not time-consistent when
future cost is discounted.
We remark that DEU is time-consistent even when
future cost is discounted. For example, a risk-neutral
decision maker, who makes a decision today, would
choose Y, because E[0.922 Y ] ≈ 169 is smaller than
E[0.92X] ≈ 276. A year later, she still prefers Y to X,
because E[0.92Y ] ≈ 184 is smaller than E[X] = 300.
3 IRM with discounted cost
When future reward is not discounted, ERM is known
to be time-consistent [3] and also is attractive for com-
putational purposes. A key property of ERM that we
can exploit for efficient optimization is its recursive-
ness. We discuss the recursiveness of ERM in Sec-
tion 3.1 to motivate IRM, which will be defined infor-
mally in Section 3.2 (a formal definition is postponed
to Section 4). In Section 3.3, we will show that an
IRM can represent the preference of a decision maker
that cannot be represented with any DEU.
3.1 Recursiveness of entropic risk measure
Consider a two-period setting as follows. At time 0
(the day before departure), a traveler knows that TP ,
the travel time along path P, has the distribution spec-
ified in Table 3 (we will use TQ only in Section 5).
Specifically, the traffic condition, Ψ, is normal with
probability 0.9 and busy with probability 0.1. When
Ψ is normal, we have TP = 10. WhenΨ is busy, TP has
a uniform distribution with support [20, 80]. At time 1
(immediately before departure), the traveler finds out
whether Ψ is normal or busy.
We can calculate E[TP ] in two ways. First, TP has
a mass probability of 0.9 at TP = 10 and a proba-
bility density fP (x) = 1/600 for 20 ≤ x ≤ 80, so
that E[TA] = 10 × 0.9 +
￿ 80
20 x/600 dx = 14. Second,
the conditional expected value at time 1 is E[TP |Ψ =
normal] = 10 and E[TP |Ψ = busy] = 50; because Ψ is
normal with probability 0.9 and busy with probability
0.1, we have E[TP ] = 10×0.9+50×0.1 = 14. Formally,
E[E[TP |Ψ]] = E[TP ].
The ERM has also this recursive property. Formally,
ERM(γ)[ERM(γ)[TP |Ψ]] = ERM(γ)[TP ] for any γ. For
example, when γ = 1.0, we have
ln(0.9 e10 + 0.1 e
ln
￿ 80
20
ex
60 dx) = ln(0.9 e10 +
￿ 80
20
ex
600
dx),
where the left-hand side calculates ERM(1.0)[TP ] re-
cursively. If we evaluate ERM(1.0)[TP |Ψ] at time 0,
we do not know whether Ψ is normal or busy, so
that ERM(1.0)[TP |Ψ] is a random variable. At time
1, however, Ψ becomes known, and ERM(1.0)[TP |Ψ]
becomes deterministic. Now, notice that a risk mea-
sure, including ERM, is a function that maps a ran-
dom variable to a real number that represents the
riskiness of the random variable. Then recursive
calculation of ERM(1.0)[ERM(1.0)[TP |Ψ]] can be inter-
preted as follows. We will evaluate the riskiness of
TP with ERM
(1.0)[TP |Ψ] at time 1, and the value of
ERM(1.0)[TP |Ψ] is random at time 0. So, at time 0,
we evaluate the riskiness of the ERM(1.0)[TP |Ψ] with
ERM(1.0)[ERM(1.0)[TA|C]].
3.2 Informal definition of IRM
The idea of recursive calculation of ERM motivates
us to study IRM. For example, suppose that we will
evaluate the conditional tail expectation (CTE) of TP
at time 1. CTE is also known as conditional value at
risk and formally defined as follows:
CTE(α)[Y ] ≡ (1− β)E[Y | Y > Vα] + (β − α)Vα
1− α , (2)
where Vα ≡ min{y | Pr(Y ≤ y) ≥ α} is a value
at risk of a random variable Y , and β ≡ Pr(Y ≤
Vα). When Y has a continuous distribution, we
simply have CTE(α)[Y ] = E[Y | Y > Vα]. The
50%-CTE of TP to be evaluated at time 1 will be
CTE(50%)[TP | Ψ = normal] = 10 with probability
0.9 and CTE(50%)[TP | Ψ = busy] = 65 with probabil-
ity 0.1. Because CTE(50%)[TP |Ψ] is a random variable,
we can evaluate its 50%-CTE, which turns out to be
CTE(50%)[CTE(50%)[TP |Ψ]] = 21.
Note that CTE(50%)[CTE(50%)[·]] is a risk measure but
different from CTE(50%)[·], because CTE(50%)[TP ] =
18. In fact, CTE(50%)[CTE(50%)[·]] is called an iter-
ated conditional tail expectation (ICTE) in [1, 4]. No-
tice that an IRM, ρ[·] ≡ ρ˙0[ρ˙1[·]], can be constructed
from arbitrary risk measures, ρ˙0 and ρ˙1. Also, an
IRM can be extended to more than two periods (e.g.,
ρ ≡ ρ˙0ρ˙1ρ˙2).
3.3 Overcoming the limitations with IRM
We will see, in Section 4, that ICTE satisfies the condi-
tions that suffice to guarantee that dynamic program-
ming can be used to find an optimal policy with re-
spect to an ICTE when future reward is discounted.
The optimal policy found with dynamic programming
is guaranteed to be optimal over time, and ICTE is
time-consistent in this sense.
In the rest of this section, we will see that an IRM
can represent the preference that cannot be repre-
sented with any DEU. Specifically, recall the example
constructed in Section 2.1, where we have seen that
no DEU can represent the preference of the decision
maker who would choose payment method A over B.
We will show that this preference can be represented
with ICTE. We will use ICTE(α)n to denote the ICTE
evaluated on Day n, where the ICTE is defined recur-
sively with CTE having parameter α (see (2)).
First, observe that ICTE(α)0 [
￿N
n=0 λ
nAn] = 1, 000 for
any α, because
￿N
n=0 λ
nAn = 1, 000 surely. A key
property of ICTE is that a deterministic constant is
mapped to the constant itself (this can be shown
more formally, using ICTE’s translation-invariance
and positive-homogeneity defined in Section 4).
The amount of payment with B is probabilistic, and
its ICTE can be calculated as follows. We define a
state space, S ≡ {0, 1}, so that, immediately after the
beginning of Day 0, we transition to state S = 0 with
probability 0.9525 and to S = 1 otherwise. The state
does not change for 20 days. If S = 0, the payment
is not needed. If S = 1, the payment is needed as
specified in the third row of Table 1. We can calculate
the ICTE for each state and for each day backwards.
In particular, ICTE(α)0 is calculated from ICTE
(α)
1 :
ICTE(α)0 [
N￿
n=0
λnBn] = CTE
(α)
￿
ICTE(α)1 [
N￿
n=0
λnBn | S]
￿
.
Because the amount of payment is deterministic given
S, we have ICTE(α)1
￿￿N
n=0 λ
nBn | S = 0
￿
= 0, and
ICTE(α)1 [
N￿
n=0
λnBn | S = 1] = 1000 (1− λ
20)
1− λ ,
where we assume λ < 1 for simplicity. Because S = 0
with probability 0.9525 and S = 1 otherwise, we have
ICTE(α)0 [
N￿
n=0
λnBn] =
￿
1000 (1−λ20)
1−λ if α ≥ 0.9525
0.0475
1−α
1000 (1−λ20)
1−λ otherwise.
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Figure 1: The painted area denotes the (λ,α) with
which (3) holds. Specifically, α > 1− 0.0475 1−λ201−λ .
Hence, we have
ICTE(α)0 [
N￿
n=0
λnAn] < ICTE
(α)
0 [
N￿
n=0
λnBn] (3)
for sufficiently high α and λ. Figure 1 illustrates the
region of (λ,α) where (3) holds.
We have seen that ICTE can represent the preference
that cannot be represented with any DEU. Notice that
we must interpret that the cost having a small ICTE
is more preferable than the one with a large ICTE,
which is in contrast to DEU. Otherwise, one would
prefer a cost to another when the former cost stochas-
tically dominates the latter. The above argument can
be summarized as:
Proposition 2 Let An, Bn, c, ε, N be as defined in
Proposition 1. Let ICTE(α)n denotes the ICTE evalu-
ated at the beginning of the n-th day. Then we have
ICTE(α)0 [
￿N
n=0 λ
nAn] < ICTE
(α)
0 [
￿N
n=0 λ
nBn] if one
of the following two conditions is satisfied:
i) α > 1− (1− ε)(1− λ
N )
N (1− λ) and 0 ≤ λ < 1;
ii) α > ε and λ = 1.
Proposition 2 should be compared against Proposi-
tion 1. The definition of ICTE will be made formal
in Section 4.
4 Dynamic programming with IRM
In this section, we discuss the conditions that an IRM
should satisfy so that dynamic programming can be
used to find an optimal policy for an MDP with re-
spect to the IRM of the discounted cumulative cost.
The optimal policy found by dynamic programming is
optimal for each n ∈ [0, N) because of the way the
optimal policy is constructed. That is, the IRM sat-
isfying the conditions to be specified in this section is
time-consistent.
4.1 Definitions
Roughly speaking, an IRM, ρ, is defined recursively as
ρn[·] = ρ˙n[ρn+1[·]], where ρ˙n[·] is a risk measure (RM;
more precisely, conditional RM to be defined in the
following) for n ∈ [0, N). It is important to understand
ρn and ρ˙n in a dynamic setting. For example, ρn[Y ]
represents the riskiness of Y that is evaluated at time
n, where Y is in general random at time n. Before time
n, ρn[Y ] is random, because the value of ρn[Y ] depends
on the state Sn at time n and Sn is random before
time n. As time passes, we obtain more information
about ρn[Y ], and ρn[Y ] becomes deterministic at time
n. In this sense, ρn[Y ] is called Fn-measurable, which
can be understood more precisely with measure theory.
Formally,
Definition 1 Consider a filtered probability space,
(Ω,F , P ), such that F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ FN = F , where
N ∈ [1,∞). Let Y be an F-measurable random vari-
able. We say that ρ is an IRM if ρN [Y ] = Y and
ρn[Y ] = ρ˙n[ρn+1[Y ]], where ρ˙n is a conditional RM
that maps an Fn+1-measurable random variable to an
Fn-measurable random variable, for n ∈ [0, N).
Notice that ρ˙n is a conditional RM instead of a (classi-
cal) RM, which maps a random variable to a real num-
ber. For example, a conditional expectation, E[· | S￿],
is a conditional RM, where S￿ denotes the state at
time ￿. Observe that E[X | S￿] is random before time
￿ but is deterministic at and after time ￿. When ρ˙￿[·] =
E[· | S￿] for ￿ ∈ [0, N), the corresponding IRM is also a
conditional expectation, ρ￿[·] = E[· | S￿], for ￿ ∈ [0, N)
by the recursiveness of expectation. Likewise, if ρ˙￿
is a conditional entropic-risk-measure, ERMγ [· | S￿],
for ￿ ∈ [0, N), then we have ρ￿[·] = ERMγ [· | S￿] for
￿ ∈ [0, N). If ρ˙￿ is a conditional CTE, CTEγ [· | S￿],
￿ ∈ [0, N), then the corresponding ρ is an ICTE. No-
tice that IRM ρn evaluated at a particular time n is a
conditional RM for each n ∈ [0, N).
In the following, we define a class of IRMs that allow
dynamic programming to find an optimal policy with
respect to the IRM. Specifically, we will define strong
monotonicity, translation-invariance, and positive ho-
mogeneity of the IRM. These definitions can also be
found for example in [14].
If a costX is surely larger than a cost Y , then the value
of a conditional RM of X should be larger than that of
Y . A conditional RM having such a property is called
monotonic. We study an IRM defined recursively with
monotonic conditional-RMs. Formally,
Definition 2 Consider a conditional RM, ρ˙, that
maps a G1-measurable random variable to a G0-
measurable random variable. We say that ρ˙ is mono-
tonic if Pr(X ≥ Y ) = 1 ⇒ Pr(ρ[X] ≥ ρ[Y ]) = 1 for
any G1-measurable X and Y . An IRM, ρ, as defined
in Definition 1, is called strongly monotonic if ρ˙￿ is
monotonic for each ￿ ∈ [0, N).
For simplicity, we say that a RM is monotonic, when
the corresponding conditional RM is monotonic. For
example, expectation, ERM, and CTE are monotonic.
Hence, ICTE is strongly monotonic. We can also com-
pose a complex monotonic-RM from simple ones. For
example, the following composite RM is monotonic:
ρ[·] ≡ (1− β)E[·] + β CTEα[·] (4)
for 0 < β < 1, because
Proposition 3 Let f(x1, . . . , xn) be a non-decreasing
function (i.e., ∂f/∂xi ≥ 0 for i ∈ [1, n]). If con-
ditional RM ρ˙(i) is monotonic for each i ∈ [1, n],
then conditional RM ρ˙[·] ≡ f(ρ˙(1)[·], . . . , ρ˙(n)[·]) is also
monotonic.
However, variance and other RMs that quantify the de-
viations from the mean, either one-sided or two-sided,
are usually not monotonic. We will also use the fol-
lowing definitions:
Definition 3 Consider the ρ˙ as defined in Defini-
tion 2. We say that ρ˙ is translation-invariant if
ρ˙[X + b] = ρ˙[X] + b for any G1-measurable X and G0-
measurable b. We say that ρ˙ is positive homogeneite
if ρ˙[aX] = a ρ˙[X] for any G1-measurable X and G0-
measurable a.
In particular, expectation, ERM, CTE, and the com-
posite RM (4) are translation-invariant. Also, expec-
tation, CTE, and the composite RM (4) are positive
homogeneite, but ERM is not.
4.2 Dynamic programming
Consider a discrete time MDP over a finite horizon
[0, N ], having state space ∪n∈[0,N ]Sn, action space
A, transition probability pn(sn+1|sn, an), and cost
rn(sn+1, sn, an) for sn ∈ Sn, sn+1 ∈ Sn+1, an ∈ A,
and n ∈ [0, N). Here, pn(sn+1|sn, an) denotes the
probability that the state at time n + 1 is sn+1 given
that action an is taken from state sn at time n;
rn(sn+1, sn, an) denotes the cost incurred immediately
after time n when action an is taken from state sn at
time n and the state at n+1 is sn+1. For succinctness,
rn(sn+1, sn, an) will be denoted by rn.
A policy, π, is a function that maps a pair of a time,
￿, and a state, s￿, into an action, a￿ (i.e., the action a￿
is taken at time ￿, if the state at time ￿ is s￿). Let Π
be the set of candidate policies.
We seek to find an optimal policy, π￿ ∈ Π, that min-
imizes an IRM, ρn[R(λ)|π], of the discounted cumu-
lative cost, R(λ) =
￿N−1
￿=0 λ
￿ r￿, at every n ∈ [0, N).
When ρ￿ is translation-invariant and positive homo-
geneite, we have
ρ￿[R
(λ)] =
￿−1
i=0
λi ri + λ
￿ ρ￿[
N−1￿
i=￿
λi−￿ ri]. (5)
That is, the riskiness of R(λ) evaluated at time ￿ is
equal to the sum of the discounted cumulative cost in-
curred before time ￿ and the riskiness of the discounted
cumulative cost to be incurred after time ￿. Notice
that the action to be taken at (and after) time ￿ cannot
affect the cost incurred before time ￿. Hence, the op-
timal action at time ￿ that minimizes ρ￿[
￿N−1
i=￿ λ
i−￿ri]
also minimizes ρn[R(λ)]. That is, the optimal action at
time ￿ is independent of the cost incurred before then.
The following theorem implies that the optimal policy
can be found with dynamic programming, where the
optimal policy minimizes ρn[
￿N−1
￿=n λ
￿−n r￿] (hence,
also ρn[R(λ)]) for every pair of state and time (given
the state and the time):
Theorem 1 Consider the MDP as defined at the be-
ginning of Section 4.2. Let ρ be an iterated RM as
defined in Definition 1. We assume that ρ is strongly
monotonic and that ρn is translation-invariant and
positive homogeneite for each n ∈ [0, N). Let
V λn (sn,πn) ≡ ρn[
￿N−1
￿=n λ
￿−n r￿ | Sn = sn,πn], for
n ∈ [0, N ], be the value of ρn[
￿N−1
￿=n λ
￿−n r￿] given that
we use policy πn ∈ Π to choose actions, starting from
state sn ∈ Sn. Then, for every sn ∈ Sn and for ev-
ery n ∈ [0, N), the solution to the following optimal-
ity equations minimizes V λn (sn,πn), where we define
V λn (sn) ≡ minπn∈Π V λn (sn,πn):
V λN (sN ) = 0,
V λn (sn) = min
a∈A
ρn
￿
D
s￿∈Sn+1
￿
rn(s￿, sn, a) + λV λn+1(s￿)
pn(s￿|sn, a)
￿￿
for s￿ ∈ S￿ such that ￿ ∈ [0, N ] and for 0 ≤ n < N ,
where Ds∈S
￿
x(s)
p(s)
￿
denotes a discrete random variable
taking value x(s) with probability p(s) for s in a set S.
A proof of the theorem is provided in the associated
technical report [7], where the key property that we
exploit is (5).
Notice that CTE is monotonic, so that ICTE is strongly
monotonic. Also, it can be shown that ICTEn is
translation-invariant for each n ∈ [0, N ], because an
IRM defined recursively with translation-invariant ρ¯ is
translation-invariant (see Lemma 3 in the associated
technical report [7]) and CTE is translation-invariant.
Likewise, ICTEn is positive homogeneite, because CTE
is positive homogeneite (see Lemma 4 in [7]).
Notice that, when future cost is not discounted (λ =
1), positive homogeneity is not needed for (5) to hold.
In fact, the proof of Theorem 1 implies that the theo-
rem holds without positive homogeneity when λ = 1.
We have seen in Section 2 that ERM is not time-
consistent when future cost is discounted, even though
it is time-consistent without discounting. Now, this
can be explained by the fact that ERM is strongly
monotonic and translation-invariant but not positive-
homogeneite.
When an IRM is not translation-invariant, we cannot
separate the discounted cumulative reward that has
already been incurred from that to be incurred as in
(5). This suggests that the optimal action depends on
the discounted cumulative cost that has been incurred
by the time the action is taken. Then the state of
an MDP would need to include the information about
the discounted cumulative cost that has already been
incurred [8]. The expanded state space would make
the optimization with dynamic programming less ef-
ficient. For this reason, ERM might appear to be an
ideal RM when future cost is not discounted, because
ERM is strongly monotonic and translation-invariant.
However, we will see in Section 5 that ERM cannot rep-
resent some of the preferences that can be represented
with ICTE even when future cost is not discounted.
5 Undiscounted future cost
In this section, we will illustrate the limitation of ERM
when future cost is not discounted. Recall the path P
having the travel time TP specified in Table 3. We will
also consider the path Q with travel time TQ, which is
uniformly distributed between 0 minutes and 20 min-
utes when the traffic condition is normal, and is 50
minutes when it is busy. Observe that P and Q have
the same expected travel time, E[TP ] = E[TQ].
Informal interviews with our colleagues suggest that
some people prefer path P to path Q, and others pre-
fer Q to P. There are also people whose preference
depends on the purpose of the travel and other con-
ditions. Whether a traveler takes P or Q depends on
how the traveler perceives the risk associated with the
travel time.
It turns out that a traveler who makes decisions
based on ERM(γ) would choose path Q no matter how
he sets the parameter, γ. Formally, ERM(γ)[TP ] ≥
ERM(γ)[TQ] for any γ, where the equality holds only
when γ = 0:
Lemma 1 Let U [a, b] denotes a random variable uni-
formly distributed between a and b for −∞ < a ≤ b <
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Figure 2: Entropic risk measure of TP and TQ.
∞. Let X and Y be random variables such that:
X =
￿ − 12 w.p. p
U [0, x] o.w.
Y =
￿
U [−1, 0] w.p. p
x
2 o.w.
where p ≡ x2/(1 + x2) and 0 ≤ x < ∞ Then
ERM(γ)[αX + β] ≥ ERM(γ)[αY + β] for any α > 0,
−∞ < β <∞, and −∞ < γ <∞, where ERM(0) ≡ E.
A proof of the lemma is provided in the associated
technical report [7] (see Figure 2(c) for a numerical
support). A traveler could make decisions so that he
chooses a path that has a larger value of ERM. Then he
would choose path P. However, such a traveler would
choose a path that surely takes longer than another,
because ERM(γ)[T + c] = ERM(γ)[T ] + c for any con-
stant c (i.e., we can make a travel time, T , more at-
tractive to the traveler by adding extra travel time,
c > 0, to the T ). That is, maximizing ERM is by no
means rational.
It turns out that ICTE can represent the preference
of P to Q. Observe that CTE(50%)1 [TQ|Ψ = busy] =
50 and CTE(50%)1 [TQ|Ψ = normal] = 15, so that
CTE(50%)0 [CTE
(50%)
1 [TQ|Ψ]] = 22, which is greater than
CTE(50%)[CTE(50%)[TP |Ψ]] = 21. Thus, an iterated
CTE can indeed represent the risk-sensitivity of the
traveler who prefers path P to path Q. A CTE can also
represent such risk-sensitivity, because CTE(80%)[Tp] =
30 is smaller than CTE(80%)[TQ] = 34+4/9. However,
CTE is not time-consistent and causes the issues that
we have seen in Section 2.2.
6 Concluding remarks
We remark that the results about Theorem 1 are re-
lated to but different from Ruszczyn´ski [14], who pro-
poses ways to find optimally risk-averse policies for
an MDP by defining a Markov risk measure and a
discounted measure of risk. Specifically, Ruszczyn´ski
shows that dynamic programming can be used to find
an optimal policy for an MDP over a finite horizon
with respect to the Markov risk measure, where fu-
ture reward is not discounted. Also, it is shown that
value iteration can be used to find an optimal pol-
icy for an MDP over the infinite horizon with respect
to the discounted measure of risk, where future re-
ward is discounted. The Markov risk measure and the
discounted measure of risk are defined to be particu-
lar IRMs that have specified properties, including the
three properties that we require in Theorem 1. How-
ever, one of the specified properties in [14] is convexity,
which we do not require in Theorem 1. We have also
seen that positive homogeneity is not needed for dy-
namic programming to apply when future reward is
not discounted.
The primary message of this paper is that DEU has
limitations in representing the preference of a deci-
sion maker who is averse to or seeking risk when fu-
ture reward is discounted, and such limitations can be
overcome with IRM. Theorem 1 clarifies the conditions
that suffice to guarantee that an optimal policy with
respect to an IRM can be found with dynamic pro-
gramming. These conditions in turn guarantee that
the IRM is time-consistent in the sense that the opti-
mal policy found with dynamic programming does not
change over time. We have also seen that EUD (partic-
ularly, with exponential utility) is not time-consistent,
and the decisions made based on EUD can be com-
pletely irrational.
The focus of this paper has been on what can repre-
sent rational preferences on risk and time. However,
corresponding psychological studies would also be an
interesting direction. There has been limited work on
behavioral models that take into account both risk and
time. In particular, how well can DEU and EUD rep-
resent people’s preference?
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